Israel: What Went Wrong on October 6?: The Partial Report of the Israeli Commission of

Key takeaways

content: "@IsraelWhatWent1974" -file:@IsraelWhatWent1974

Reading notes

• It emerges therefore that, chronologically, the Commission in this report deals with the two intermediate chapters (the information and its evaluation; the state of alert) and leaves for a later report the other two subjects (the deployment that preceded the state of alert, and the battles up to the containment of the enemy, which began with the ending of the period of alert).

• The opening of the war by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, at approximately 14.00 hours, took the Israel Defence Forces by surprise in that until the early morning hours of that day the IDF's Supreme Command and the political leadership did not evaluate that total war was about to commence

• e Supreme Command mistakenly assumed that it would break out only at 18.00 hours

• Responsibility for these mistaken evaluations should be placed primarily on the Director of Military Intelligence [DMI]

• It was only at about 4.30 a.m. on Yom Kippur that the DM1I, on the strength of fresh intelligence he had received, notified that the enemy would open war at 18.00 hours on both fronts

• There were three reasons for the failure of the authorities responsible for evaluation:

• Firstly, their obdurate adherence to what was known as "the conception," according to which a) Egypt would not launch war against Israel before she had first ensured sufficient air power to attack Israel in depth, and in particular Israel's principal airfields, so as to paralyse the Israeli air force, and b) that Syria would only launch an all-out attack on Israel simultaneously with Egypt

• Secondly, the Director of Military Intelligence assured the IDF that he would be able to give advance warning of any enemy intention to launch all-out war in good time to allow for the orderly call- up of the reserves

• Thirdly, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, the Intelligence Branch (Research) had received numerous warning reports, supplied to it by the information- gathering department of the Intelligence Branch and by other information-gathering authorities in the country. The Research Division of the Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence did not correctly evaluate the warnings contained in these reports, owing to their doctrinaire adher- ence to the "conception" and the fact that they were prepared to explain the enemy deployment along the front lines, which was without precedent in the size of the forces and in their orientation towards the fronts, on the assumption that all this testified only to a defensive deploy- ment in Syria and the holding of a multi- arm "exercise" in Egypt, similar to exer- cises held there in the past.

• . In addition, there were errors in the working of the state of readiness during the days preceding the war. There was an unjustified delay in the mobilization of the reserves. It is our opinion that, on the basis of the data in his possession, the Chief of Staff should already have recom- mended partial mobilization of the land forces at the beginning of the week preced- ing the war, to maintain the right pro- portions between the enemy forces, which were at full alert and prepared for action against us, and our own forces.

• Secondly, we have found that, in total reliance on the Intelligence Branch's assurance that it could always give the IDF sufficient warning for orderly mobil- ization of the reserves, no defence plan properly worked out in detail was prepared for the eventuality that the regular forces would have to check, on their own, an all-out attack by the enemy on the Egyp- tian and Syrian fronts simultaneously - with the IDF being caught by surprise as they were.

• Thirdly, even after receipt of the warning on Saturday morning, the regular armoured forces on the Canal front were not optimally deployed in time, under the circumstances created, in accordance with the plan that existed for the defensive deployment of the regular forces. Fur- thermore, no clear directive was given that morning to the GOC Southern Com- mand and from him also to the lower echelons, as to how they were to prepare for the attack, and lack of clarity prevailed in issuing operational orders and ensuring their implementation.

• meeting of the IDF General Staff on September 24, 1973, the GOC Northern Command, Maj-Gen. Yitzhak Hofi, expressed concern at the limitations involved in receiving sufficient warning in view of the dangerous situation on the Golan Heights following increased Syrian deployment bv means of an effective anti-aircraft missile alignment

• On September 26, the eve of Rosh Hashana, MOD visited the area in order to gain a first-hand impression of the situation, and also issued a warning to the Syrians. A certain reinforcement of armoured and artillery deployment on the Golan Heights was decided upon.

• Prime Minister decided to convene, following her return from her trip to Strasbourg and Vienna on Sep- tember 30 to October 2, a military-poli- tical consultation on October 3

• Brig.-Gen. Shalev gave an intelligence report which concluded with the assessment that "the possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian war does not seem likely to me, since there has been no change in their assessment of the state of forces in Sinai so that they could go to war." None of those present disagreed with this assessment. At the end of this consultation the Prime Minister decided to submit the subject of the situa- tion along the borders for discussion in the Cabinet following Yom Kippur, at the regular Cabinet meeting scheduled for Sunday, October 7.

• (Saturday) At 09.05 the Premier immediately aproved mobilization of the defensive force, and at 09.25 she decided in favour of total mobilization as recommended by the C-o-S. At the same discussion at the Prime Minister's, it was decided for political reasons not to deliver a preventive blow, as proposed by the C-o-S. The Prime Minister then conferred with the US Ambassador, in order to explain the situa- tion to the US Government. After this meeting a Cabinet session, beginning at 12 noon, was held. The Cabinet Ministers voiced no opposition to the decision not to launch a preventive attack on the enemy.

• lack of clear definition as to the division of authority, duties and responsibilities concerning secu- rity matters amongst the three authorities dealing with these matters: the Govern- ment and the Prime Minister; the Minister of Defence; and the Chief of Staff, who heads the IDF; and in the determination of the relationship between the political leadership and the IDF High Command.

• four basic assumptions (para. 5 of the report), which in turn were based on the primary assumption that the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence do not necessarily have to be concentrated in the hands of one person.

• We have reached the conclusion that the state of affairs which existed up to the Yom Kippur War - which prevented independent political, strategic, operational and tactical intelligence eval- uations because of their concentration in one organization and under one authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the absence of a special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence to allow for independent evaluation - played a major role in the inability to arrive at a true intelligence picture from all aspects.

• In the light of what has been stated above we regard it as our duty to recommend the termination of Lt.-General David Elazar's appointment as Chief of Staff.

• At this stage we are not proffering a final recommendation as to Major-General Gonen's capacity to fulfil functions in the IDF, but we recommend that he does not fulfil an active function until the Commis- sion completes its investigation regarding the containment stages of the war.

• We have carefully considered these matters and reached the conclusion that, by the criterion of reasonable conduct riequired of the bearer of the post of Minister of Defence, the Minister was not obliged to order additional or different precau- tionarv measures [to] those recommended to him by the General Staff of the IDF, according to the joint assessment and the advice of the Director of Military Intel- ligence and the Chief of Staff.

• It is greatly to the Prime Minister's credit that, under the circumstances, during the emergency of Saturday morning, she made proper use of the authority vested in her to make decisions. She decided wisely, with common sense and speedily in favour of the full mobilization of the reserves, despite weighty political considerations, thereby performing a most important service for the defence of the State.

• These facts reinforce the Commission in its opinion that not only does the IDF possess the capacity to absorb criticism and draw the painful conclusions implied, but that it will thereby increase and enhance its strength