The 1973 Arab War coalition: Aims, coherence, and gain‐distribution

Key takeaways

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Reading notes

• The Arab war coalition of 1973 underlined the emergence of a core triangle of Arab power, comprising Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia

• Its most important contribution was the definition of new Arab strategy in the conflict with Israel, namely, the 'strategy of phases', which in principle accepted coexistence with Israel in its pre-1967 borders and lay new ground rules for seeking that goal.

• The official approval of the diplomatic option by the Arab summit conference held in Algiers shortly after the cease-fire constituted a turning point in Arab-Israeli relations and paved the way to Arab participation at the Geneva Conference stipulated by Security Council Resolution 338.

• This was conspicuously manifested in the role this core coalition played in articulating and conducting a new and open concept of international relations, which was an antidote of the Nasserist anti-western 'third worldism' and antagonism on the regional level. Whether or not the 'strategy of phases' had originally meant to be an ongoing, piecemeal process of weakening Israel until its final collapse, it revealed the Arab world's limitations concerning Israel, even after a war initiated and conducted probably under the most favourable strategic and military conditions.

• In principle, the war thus bore the fruits envisioned by its architect and leader, Anwar al-Sadat: a 'step-by-step' peace process mediated by the United States and backed by Arab and international pressure on isolated and weakened Israel.

• the war succeeded in alerting the superpowers and demonstrating the dangers of the Middle East conflict to their own relationship. Moreover, although Israel managed to repulse the joint Arab offensive, the relatively long war claimed a high, painful number of casualties, and the first few days of being strategically surprised, exposed to a co-ordinated attack on two fronts, left an unforgettable impression on public morale in Israel.

• In this context even though the Israeli forces reached the km 101 from Cairo and the Third Army faced the threat of total destruction, Egypt managed to preserve its military presence on the east bank of the Canal, while Syria ended the war with the loss of further territory, with the Israeli forces at gun-range from the outskirts of Damascus. Both parties, however, apparently gained from the Arab oil boycott and other measures linked to the conflict with Israel no less than from their military achievements.

• Indeed, despite their poor military gains in the war, both Egypt and Syria were politically rewarded though Egypt proved to have gained much more in territorial and political terms. Egypt's desperate military situation and potential defeat notwithstanding, it once again was able to set the tone for the rest of its Arab partners in shaping post-war diplomacy and extracting the lion's share of its revenues.

• Egypt was in a better position to exploit the war results due to a number of reasons that provided Sadat with wider margins of political manoeuvrability both internationally and domestically:

• Sadat was ready for a strategic shift from the Soviet orbit to the United States which he perceived the key to recovering Sinai. His pragmatism and previously expressed interest in a 'step-by-step' process of settlement made him an easier partner to an American-led peace process.

• The geostrategic depth provided by the sizeable and scarcely inhabited Sinai to both Egypt and Israel offered better opportunities than other occupied Arab lands for the American peace strategy.

• Egypt's regional weight and leadership, coupled with centralized decision-making embodied by the president and a political-military establishment, encouraged both Israel and the United States to focus on peacemaking with Egypt in order to undermine a future Arab war coalition. Also, Egypt's status as a pivotal Arab state enabled Sadat to act semi-independently, in spite of the compelling collective force of the Arab regional system.

• In contrast, Asad had to cope with an entirely different reality. The peace process was by far less crucial for Syria economically or strategically.

• Representing the 'Alawi minority and the Ba'th ideology, Asad's regime was inherently challenged by radical opponents at home as well as by his radical neighbour Iraq, now more hostile than ever.

• Syria's politicized military elite and strong commitment to radical Pan Arab ideology turned any settlement with Israel extremely complicated, slow, and conditional on advance understanding regarding the final objective.

• Unlike Sadat's reliance on diplomacy and tactical approach, Asad rigidly adhered to the strategic goal, insisting that Israel would give up territory only under military pressure produced by a unified Arab front.83

• Ultimately, mainly due to Egyptian and Saudi commitments and pressures on the US, Syria too was rewarded in territorial terms for its war effort, despite its military inferiority and different approach to a settlement with Israel

• Israel's peacemaking policy and essential understanding with the United States on its strategic goals intensified inter-Arab differences. Jerusalem gave priority to a settlement with Egypt that would divide the Arab front and diminish considerably the threat of another Arab offensive, even if no further progress in the peace process was to be made.

• Hence, Israel's intimate contacts and willingness to negotiate separately with Jordan on the future of the West Bank, remained theoretical, while the Hashemite attempts to effect a military disengagement along the Jordan River only aggravated Syria's and the PLO's anxiety lest they be left out of the settlement's circle.

• To prevent such a scenario, Syria led the strategy of collective Arab action in the quest for peaceful settlement with Israel that would guarantee a comprehensive settlement. This policy accounted for Syrian radicalized regional policy in the face of Sadat's growing autonomy in seeking Egypt's interest in further territorial settlements with Israel embodied by the 1975 interim agreement over Sinai, and eventually by his historic visit to Jerusalem.