The Road to Rebellion Arab Palestine in the 1930's

Key takeaways

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Reading notes

• There are recurring cycles that characterised the events of the 1920's and 1930's

• Diplomacy and violence

• Zionist pressure on the British would establish a favourable situation for them

• Arabs would then use political or diplomatic means to obtain their rights

• This would fail and led to riots/violence which produced reports sympathetic to the Arab side

• Zionists then used their superior diplomatic influence in London to annul the influence of these reports

• Fate of the 1930 white paper was a typical example

• Sir John Hope Simpson - existing Arab land could no longer sustain the burden of Jewish immigration, and was responsible for Arab unemployment

• On October 30, 1930, Baldwin, Churchill, and Amery published a letter in the Times accusing the government of pursuing a policy inconsistent with the mandate

• General J. C. Smuts (former PM south Africa) protests the policy

• Weizmann's Trial and Error

• Believed that Lord Passfield- colonial secretary was unfriendly to the Zionists

• Arranged the meet his wife to change his mind (did not work)

• Also tried to meet with PM James Ramsay MacDonald who was also reluctant

• Attempted to use the PM's son to gain access (Didn't prove successful)

• Used lady Astor to gain access when travelling to Switzerland

• Also meet others such as the American secretary of State

• Was another meeting in London with the PM

• Weizmann ''One thin the Jews will never forgive, and that is having being fooled''

• "I can't understand how you, as good British patriots, don't see the moral implications of promises given to the Jews, and I regret to see that you seem to deal with them rather frivolously." At this point "the grin disappeared.

• Finally a meeting with the British cabinet and a group form the Jewish agency was assembled

• Included; Laski, Rothschild, Namier, Stein, Sacher, and Weizmann

• Change of policy was at hand

• On February 13, 1931 - the 1930 white paper not imply any change in government immigration policy nor did it place any restriction upon Jewish purchasing of land

• Arabs referred to this as the 'black letter'

• MacDonald's letter stirred the Arabs

• Early 1931 saw a financial commission cut back on public works and social services in Palestine

• Same year saw a new high commissioner; Arthur Wauchope (very unpopular amongst Arabs)

• Only selected after consultations with Weizmann

• In 1933 legal Jewish immigration jumped to 30,327- second highest quota since 1920

• Illegal immigration was around 22,400

• In 1932 Arabs decided not to cooperate in any field that involved Jews

• Boycott the levant fair in Tel Aviv

• Political parties also began to form

• 1932 saw the Istiqlal (Independence) party and the congress of nationalist youth

• Former more modern of the two and didn't appeal locally among rural peoples

• Six were to exist by 1936

• Dominated by big families of Jerusalem

• National Defence Party was organized by the Nashashibi family, who were in competition with the Husseini family. The latter in turn organized the Arab Party in 1936, the largest of all parties in Palestine

• popularity had less to do with principles and organization than with the prestige of the Husseinis, who many people believed were related to the prophet of Islam

• Mufti was a religious leader gave the party the advantage of a strong appeal among the rural peopl

• Arab Reform Party, organized by the Khalidis, was more interested in internal chang

• National Bloc Party, was the only party that had its centre and leadership outside Jerusalem, being organized in Nablus, one of the most conservative cities of Palestine.

• None were a real challenge to the Mufti

• In 1938

• Life had become insecure for the urban "aristocracy" of Palestine, and consequently, Beirut acquired a new community of political refugees made up of well-to-do Palestinians

• Zionist politics were similar in the sense that they too were factiona

• If they were more effective in forming and implementing unified policies it was because they were more Western and modern, and because the political battles involved a foreign power, Britain

• almost all Arab parties were represented in the Arab Executive, which remained the "official" and real leadership of the Palestinian people.

• March 1933, a manifesto ''the  general tendency of Jews to take possession of the lands of this holy country and their streaming into it by hundreds and thousands through legal and illegal means has terrified the country. "

• Arab press and the Arab leaders began mounting a massive anti-immigration campaign

• , Arab rioting against the Mandate followed, and it lasted for six weeks. Twenty-four civilians were killed and 204 were injured.

• commission of inquiry headed by Sir William Murison was organized.

• February 1934 saw that the commission simply reiterated the same problems that were found as before

• : More than half the total Jewish immigration between 1919 and 1935 came in the short period from 1933-35

• e illegal immigrants deported by the British were mainly Arabs

• 1933-35 immigration was going on, the country experienced temporary prosperity

• new immigrants were affluent and brought money with them. According to Zionist sources, imported capital amounted to $49,000,000 in 1934 and $78,000,000 in 1935

• administration still had a huge surplus $30,000,000 in 1936,

• e government was not living up to its 1930 promise to develop the country and benefit the Arab fellah

• The surplus did not vanish until 1945, and the deficit of that year was caused by the requirements of the war, rather than by expenditures on social service

• Arabs made a substantial contribution to it

• 80 percent of the value of exports came from citrus products, half of which were produced by Arab owners.

• e industry was doing well because the competition from Spain was reduced by the Spanish civil war

• little effect on the Arab fellah

• four-year draught had left rural Arabs "approaching starvation in some cases.

• The Arabs' position was best explained by one of their leaders, Emile Ghory, in a letter to the Observer

• "Man cannot live by bread alone," said Jesus Christ. The Arabs appreciate and understand this golden sayin

• t announced in 1935 its intention to create another Legislative Council for Palestine - to consist of twenty-eight members, five of whom were to be "official," eleven "nominated unofficial," and twelve "elected.

• "nominated unofficial" members were to be appointed by the High Commissioner and consist of three Muslims, four Jews, and two Christians. Finally, the elected members were to consist of eight Muslims, three Jews, and one Christian.

• Arab reaction to the proposals was not negative

• Arabs considered self-government to be essentia

• t "The Jewish leaders refused them uncompromisingly." The Zionists rejected the proposals on the grounds that an Arab majority on the council "precluded the establishment of the promised National Home . . .

• Zionists were on record as opposed to any constitutional scheme that recognized the majority status of the Arab

• British believed that the representation proposed ... was fair in proportion to the population of 825,000 Muslims, 100,000 Christians, and 320,000 Jews.

• e House of Commons on March 24, 1936

• exception of two speakers, all participants in the debate were solidly pro-Zionis

• e pro-Zionists was that time was not ripe for Palestine to have a Legislative Council. The Arab people of Palestine were not ready for it

• Colonel Wedgwood, promised that his Labour Party, "would be the last body in this House to urge the colonization of Palestine by Jews if that colonization would result in the same destruction of the native races

• Wedgwood thought that the Arabs of Palestine were mostly Beduin, when in fact the Beduin element was less than seven percent of the population

• he had the idea that there was desperate need to protect the poor Arab against the rich Arab, and believed the enemy of the Arabs was not the Zionist but rather the Arab rich

• pro-Arab A. L. Crossley had a difficult time correcting

• compulsion to begin his presentation by saying, "I certainly am not an anti-Semite. I have many Jewish friends, some of whom are Zionist and some of whom. . . are not Zionists."

• He said that the Arab of Palestine was neither Beduin nor "a wholly ignorant person,"

• Captain Gazalet implied that suffrage for the "illiterate" Arabs would endanger the Jewish National Home

• Amery, for instance, admitted that the real problem was whether it was possible to reconcile the Mandate with Arab nationalism, and believed that the two were incompatible. Crossley agreed that the Mandate was "a contradiction in term

• unlike Amery, Crossley believed the problem was not Arab nationalism, rather it was Zionism

• Arab image was damaging to the Arab case, the Jewish image  was useful to the Zionist case

• influenced by the fact that Jews were Wester

• first sign of a full-scale rebellion appeared in November 1935, when Sheikh Izzedin al-Qassam, with a group of armed men, confronted British soldiers with the first organized attack since the beginning of the Mandate

• British discovery of large quantities of arms in Jaffa, which were suspected to have come to Jews from Belgium

• Arab leaders called for a one-day strike. The country came to a hal

• 1 but violence was not repeated until April 1936, a few days after the legislative proposal was killed in the House of Common

• Armed Arabs killed three Jews who were travelling on the Tulkarm-Nablus road

• Supreme Arab Committee, subsequently known as the Arab Higher Committee, was created to replace the Arab Executive. All six parties joined

• call for a general strike that would go on for six months

• Christians were represented on the Committee to emphasize total unity

• The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was elected the Committee's President and became the recognized leader of the country.

• After British underestimation,  "the strike was effectively imposed; Jaffa port was put out of action; there were intermittent local demonstrations and assaults on Jews: there was destruction of Jewish property and sniping at Jewish settlements

• British Response

• British retaliated by interning a number of Arab leaders and by bringing more troops from Egypt and Malta

• June 30, 1936, they submitted a memorandum to the High Commissioner condemning British policy and expressing sympathy with their countrymen

• r May 20, "disorder was general throughout the country

• "security measures," reference should be made to the Palestine Defence Order-in-Council and the Emergency Regulations of April 19, 1936

• May 22 the Emergency Regulations were expanded to empower local officials "to place persons under police supervision and to restrict their movement from one part of Palestine to another

• June 1, they were further expanded to empower local officers to force the opening of shops and businesses which had closed on account of a strike

• June 6, the administration was given the power to "impound labour

• 1936 annual report on Palestine, reference was made to "the establishment of a concentration camp by the Government

• neither the British nor the Arabs were willing to yield. A third party was neede

• Arab governments entered the field and on June 6 and August 7, unproductive attempts were made by Amir (prince) Abdullah of Transjordan to persuade the Arab Higher Committee to call off the strike

• August 30, however, the Committee accepted the diplomatic intervention of  the King of Iraq, thinking he could obtain concessions from his British ally. The King of Saudi Arabia and the Imam of Yemen were said to be in support of the move. The actual work of mediation was undertaken by General Nuri Said, the Foreign Minister of Ira

• Zionist intervention in British politics at home continued

• Arab leaders, however, wanted to end the strike because the economic situation had deteriorated to the point where it began to hurt Arabs.

• decided to consult the Congress of National Committees, which by now had become the unofficial "parliament" of the Palestinian Arabs

• decision was preceded by an appeal to end the strike by the Arab rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and the Yemen, and this too helped the Palestinian leaders make the decision without feeling humiliated.

• October 15, the total number of casualties was 1651

• Increase their military burden threefold

• Committee was once again formed to look into the violence

• Arab Higher Committee originally decided to boycott the Commission, but pressure from the Arab governments dissuaded it. Twelve days before the departure of the Commission for Palestine, Arab cooperation materialized.

• end of the strike did not bring about the end of violence

• Change in the quality and pattern of fighting

• June 1936, the political leadership lost control of the rebellion, partly because of disunity and partly because of British repressive

• July 3, 1937, the National Defence Party withdrew from the Arab Higher Committee

• The cause of dissension was disagreement over methods. Some leaders believed only force could attain the national goals. Others believed gradualism

• The pro Mufti rebels became known as the majlisiyeen (pro-Council)

• pro-Muftis' greatest weakness was their conservatism and lack of modern leadership

• The other group was known as the moarideen (the opposition).

• anti-Muftis were very urban

• October 1937, the British succeeded in destroying the influence of the pro-Muftis

• Arab Higher Committee and all National Committees unlawful associations.

• Mufti was dismissed from his office of President of the Supreme Muslim Council and had to flee the country

• From then on, the rebellion gradually turned inward. Arabs began shooting Arabs.

• Early instances of unrest and violence (1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933) had been largely urban. Because the national leadership did not seriously involve the rural population, the urban riots did not develop into a national rebellion

• unleashing of rural anger against urban timidity

• Money intensified the disorganization. The urban elite sought to buy security by paying the rural commanders, and since these commanders needed the money, which had become scarce since the Mufti and Qawuqji departed, they accepted such offers

• Paying the commanders did not guarantee their security, and the only other option was to collaborate with the British. Many of them refused to do this

• Sons of the rich were reared in a tradition that emphasized the mystical, rather than the material, elements of patriotism

• when the heat became intense they got out of the kitchen and they left the "common man" to roast

• In 1939, the rebellion was slowly dying out as shown by the declining number of incidents: 3,315 as compared to 5,708 in the previous year

• The greatest number of casualties from Arab attacks were suffered by Arabs: 414 dead and 373 wounded

• British decided to return the country to normality. Perhaps as a gesture of goodwill, they released the Seychelles exiles who, a few days later, arrived in Lebanon to consult with the Mufti

• Jewish attacks on Arabs increased as a result of the London Conference of February 7, 1939

• February 27, Jews attacked Arabs throughout the country killing 38 and wounding 44.

• London Conference failed after both the Arab and Jewish delegations rejected the British proposals

• British would have their own plan for Palestine and that they would soon make it public

• Jews mounted an anti-British campaign which was accompanied with violent acts. In April, the Histadrut issued a manifesto urging Jews to participate in a "campaign of resistance" against British policy.

• Tension among Jews heightened when the rumours were confirmed in the White Paper issued by the British government of May 17, 1939

• 1939 White Paper promised that in ten years Palestine would become independent

• e Arabs had come to believe, from the failure of diplomacy, that violence was the only way to achieve what they considered to be their rights. Their viewpoint seemed to have been proven correct

• Zionist rebellion was only postponed, and when it finally took place, the Palestinian Arabs proved too exhausted by the effort of rebellion between 1936 and 1939 to be in any condition to match it. The 1939 White Paper, the major Palestinian Arab achievement of the Mandate period, was thus irrevocably buried in history.