The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond

Key takeaways

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Bibliography: The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond, 2001. . Journal of Palestine Studies 31, 62–75. https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2001.31.1.62

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Abstract

Citations

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Reading notes

It was not until a year after the collapse of the Camp David talks in July 2000 that authoritative voices in the U.S. press began to challenge what had become virtual dogma: that Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat had rejected the unprecedentedly “generous offer” of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, which reportedly involved the return of the quasi-totality of Palestinian territory. Among the consequences of this dogma is the widespread notion of Palestinian responsibility for the al-Aqsa intifada that erupted a month later. Foremost among the new challenges to these perceptions in the U.S. mainstream press are the two articles reproduced below. The first, published in the 9 August 2001 issue of the New York Review of Books, is by Robert Malley, who participated in the Camp David summit as President Bill Clinton’s special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs at the National Security Council, and Hussein Agha, an editor of JPS’s sister publication, Majallat alDirasat al-Filastiniyya, with close ties to the Palestinian negotiators. The second, published in the New York Times on 26 July 2001, is by Deborah Sontag, the newspaper’s correspondent in Jerusalem.