Israeli Unilateralism and Israeli?Palestinian Relations, 2001?2006
Israeli Unilateralism and Israeli?Palestinian Relations, 2001?2006
Key takeaways
Israeli Unilateralism and Israeli/Palestinian Relations, 2001/2006
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Bibliography: Pressman, J., 2006. Israeli Unilateralism and Israeli?Palestinian Relations, 2001?2006. Int Studies Perspectives 7, 360–376. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2006.00259.x
Authors:: Jeremy Pressman
Collections:: Arab-Israeli Conflict
First-page:
Abstract
Citations
content: "@pressmanIsraeliUnilateralismIsraeli2006" -file:@pressmanIsraeliUnilateralismIsraeli2006
Reading notes
- Israeli–Palestinian relations witnessed dramatic changes from 2001– 2006. Sharon came to power, the second intifada (uprising) raged, Arafat died, Israel withdrew from Gaza, and Sharon fell ill and out of political life. Israel’s embrace of unilateralism led to the Gaza disengagement and the construction of a barrier in the West Bank. Why did Israel embrace unilateralism? Israel’s unilateral approach to the Palestinian question resulted from the failure of three other approaches to addressing the conflict: bilateral diplomacy, Greater Israel and settlements, and military suppression. Unilateralism was not inevitable, but Israelis and Palestinians missed opportunities to pursue other pathways. The United States also missed chances to jump-start bilateral diplomacy. The United States role in these years was less consistent and less proactive than under the first President Bush and President Clinton.
- I argue that Israeli unilateralism was a response to several inter-related factors: the failure of the Oslo process, the second intifada, the absence of a Palestinian partner, Israeli fatigue with the pursuit of Greater Israel, and the limits of military efforts for containing Palestinian nationalist aspirations. I
- Military suppression of the second intifada could result in tactical success but could not erase Palestinian nationalism and the resultant political demands. Believing they had no Palestinian partner, Israeli leaders took matters into their own hands. While unilateralism had not been the dominant Israeli policy, the Sharon government was not the first to embrace such policies.
- Since 1991, Israeli–Palestinian relations have moved in two directions: toward a two-state solution internally and toward a pessimistic view of the other. On both sides, polling data suggested that territorial maximalism lost support (United States Institute of Peace 2005).
- On the organizational side, Sharon formed a new political party, Kadima. In November 2005, Sharon left the Likud party and took many members with him to a new party, Kadima. The Likud members who remained opposed to the Gaza pulloutFor West Bank evacuations for that matterFstayed behind. Kadima embodied the belief that Israel needed to relinquish much of the occupied territories but in a unilateral process. Kadima was not a dovish party, however, and was not going to forsake Israel’s hold on East Jerusalem or many larger settlements in the West Bank. The Kadima Party was still in development in anticipation of elections in March 2006 when Sharon had his career-ending stroke in early January 2006.