Camp David: problem-solving or power politics as usual?

Key takeaways

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Bibliography: Princen, T., 1991. Camp David: problem-solving or power politics as usual?

Authors:: T Princen

Collections:: Arab-Israeli Conflict

First-page:

Abstract

Citations

content: "@princenCampDavidProblemsolving1991" -file:@princenCampDavidProblemsolving1991

Reading notes

t, I argue that as much as Carter wanted to capture the advantages of a 'facilitator', in the end he was constrained by his position as President of the United States to play 'power politics' as usual. I conclude that this structural constraint, more than anything, accounts for the eventual peace treat
Carter believed in the basic goodness of humankind, that conflict could be overcome if the protagonists understood each other and appreciated each other's basically good intentions. He saw conflict in very personal terms
t. Three features of Carter's approach stand out. One, Carter saw his function as primarily that of a facilitator. It was their conflict and they had to resolve it. Two, while the job was theirs to do, Carter would have to come up with the right formula since neither Sadat nor Begin nor any of Carter's predecessors had done so. A third feature of Jimmy Carter's approach was his aversion to hard bargaining.
t. And in this game, when agreement was threatened and Carter's political fortune was on the line, the USA was viewed as perfectly willing to play hardball:
If Israel saw a US bias toward Egypt, the reverse was also true: Egypt saw an equally strong US bias toward Isr
el. Both sides, it should be stressed, believed its nego- tiations with the USA as crucial, not the negotiations with each ot
In the 'brutally frank' exchange between Sadat and Begin, Carter saw his job to be damage control
protecting and advancing US interests.6' Jimmy Carter as President of the US had strong interests in mediating this dispute and he had substantial resources to bring to bear. He could make agreement very painful or very profitable. These were the facts that all concerned were well aware
Carter apparently expected the two sides to trust him enough to reveal their true underlying interests and was disappointed when they, especially the Israelis, did not: