Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David

Key takeaways

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Bibliography: Safty, A., 1991. Sadat’s Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David. Am J Economics & Sociology 50, 285–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1991.tb02295.x

Authors:: Adel Safty

Collections:: Arab-Israeli Conflict

First-page:

Abstract

Anwar Sadatwas generally praised by Western leaders and scholars for his vision, courage, and negotiating skills. A critical examination of the documentary record shows that at least as far as negotiations and decision-making, the dominant Western view is self-serving. The two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements of 1974 and 1975 started Sadat on the road to the Americansponsored peace, the price of which Sadat must have known to be the establishment of an Egypto-American-Israeli strategic alliance at the expense of Egypt's traditional role in the Arab world. Having accepted this outcome Sadat allowed his alternatives to narrow and bargaining power to diminish until they almost exclusively and entirely rested on what the United States and Israelwere prepared to offer. To the extent that the overall strategic goal of Henry Kissinger was to separate Egypt from Arab and Palestinian aspirations, and further isolate the "radical" forces in the region, thus weakening Soviet influence and paving the way for a settlement acceptable to Israel, the American negotiator achieved his goal, with hardly any opposition from Sadat. In fact, in his eagerness to accelerate his admission into the American camp, Sadat adopted a negotiating style and made concessions which surprised the Americans themselves.

Citations

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Reading notes

The two Egyptian-Israeli disengage- ment agreements of 1974 and 1975 started Sadat on the road to the American- sponsored peace, the price of which Sadat must have known to be the estab- lishment of an Egypto-American-Israeli strategic alliance at the expense of Egypt's traditional role in the Arab world. Having accepted this outcome Sadat allowed his alternatives to narrow and bargaining power to diminish until they almost exclusively and entirely rested on what the United States and Israel were prepared to offer. To the extent that the overall strategic goal of Henry Kissinger was to separate Egypt from Arab and Palestinian aspirations, and further isolate the "radical" forces in the region, thus weakening Soviet influence and paving the way for a settlement acceptable to Israel, the American negotiator achieved his goal, with hardly any opposition from Sadat.
e new operational environment largely created by the decisions which flowed from Sadat's psycho-political perceptions made it almost unavoidable that the forces at play interact in a manner consistent with the conclusion reached by Rubin and Brown.
at made the concessions demanded by the Israelis and later that day he was to tell the waiting journalists that he and Kissinger had agreed "on my six points," and without batting an eyelid handed out copies of Golda Meir's proposals as his own.
Sinai II was more than a military agreement. It had political implications, notwithstanding Egypt's Foreign Minister's assertions to the contrary. Egypt pledged itself to abstain from the use of military force to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this essentially meant the end of belligerency, which Israel had demanded
CARTER, unable to pressure Israel himself, preferred to rely on a strategy whereby the combined pressure of Arab, Soviet and American positions at the international conference would expose the recalcitrance of the Israelis. But Sadat undermined the plan by adopting a strategy more in line with Israeli thinking. Thu
le the Americans pushed for a single Arab delegation at Geneva, Sadat agreed with the Israeli position of "adamantly" opposing it. Wh
scussing the outcome of his tour, Vance informed us in particular of the Israelis' inter- pretation of Security Council Resolution 242. In their view, Vance explained, the resolution did not require total Israeli withdrawal from the territories oc- cupied in the 1967 War; it does require, on the other hand, not only the end of belligerency between Israel and the Arab states, but also full normalization of relations. It was a very biased interpretation, diametrically opposite to the Egyp- tian one. To my complete surprise, when Vance finished, President Sadat said in no uncertain terms that he was in full agreement with that interpretation. I had no option but to intervene and disagree most firmly. I sensed immediately Sadat was going to insist on his position and in fact he did so." (my italics)23 An American official who attended the meeting noted that "Sadat was putting his cards almost face up," and seemed more interested in "ingratiating himself with the American side."24
Suddenly, and without the knowledge of his Foreign Minister, Sadat entered into secret talks with the Israelis aimed at undercutting the American preparations for Geneva
eli intransigence. On September 21, 1977, he told the visiting Egyptian Foreign Minister: "President Sadat repeatedly asks me to exercise major pressure on Israel, but I want you to know that I simply cannot do it because it would be a personal political suicide for me." The Egyptian Foreign Minister urged Sadat to reevaluate his total reliance on Washington but "Sadat was un- responsive
On November 9, Sadat delivered a major speech to the People's Assembly. Suddenly he departed from his text and emotionally declared that "he was ready to go anywhere in the world, even to Jerusalem, to deliver a speech and address the Knesset if this would help save the blood of h
Fahmy wrote that he was unable to explain the reasons which motivated Sadat to undertake the Jerusalem trip. In particular, he dismisses the economic ex- planation: "The Suez Canal and oil revenues were increasing fast. The remittances of Egyptians working abroad, particularly in the Arab world, were flowing back in unprecedented amounts. ... American economic aid to Egypt had already reached high levels before the trip. The major increase had taken place in fiscal 1976, when American economic assistance jumped to US$986.6 million from $371.9 million the previous y
By proposing that Israel keep its settlers and military posts in an Egyptian Sinai, three quarters of which would be demilitarized, Begin effectively denied Egypt's sovereignty over its own territories. In so doing, he gave the Egyptians fundamental values to negotiate for: the recovery of their sovereignty over the Sinai. At the same time this strategy placed hierarchical values on the conflict in which the recovery of Egyptian territory became more important and more urgent that the question of a comprehensive settlement. Arab demands were to be divided and Egypt would have to worry about its own territories. One Israeli account of the meeting did not fail to notice that the Begin strategy implied that Sadat would have no option but to negotiate a separate peace.
t."49 Moreover, Sadat seemed uninterested in the American strategy of attempting to put combined pressure on Begin on the question of Resolution 242 and the issue of the settlements. "Carter was therefore," wrote an American official, "left in the awkward position of appearing to be more pro-Arab than Sad
On August 30 the Egyptian National Security Council met in Ismailia to plan strategy for Camp David. The meeting was chaired by Sadat. He repeated his public position of rejecting any separate solutions with Israel. With regard to the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian people he said: "Gaza will be restored to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan. This is approved by everyone. Were King Hussein to refuse . .. I shall not hesitate to pursue the negotiations and will pay no heed to their allegations that I am not entitled to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. . . . With respect to the question of a Palestinian state, our project maintains the stand we adopted three years ago namely that 'the Palestinians have their right to self-determination, with a tie to Jordan. I want to go to the limit. Ishall object to the PLO even if it is accepted by Israel.