Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000

Key takeaways

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Bibliography: Schulze, K.E., 2001. Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, 215–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100151130298

Authors:: Kirsten E. Schulze

Collections:: Arab-Israeli Conflict

First-page:

Abstract

Citations

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Reading notes

This article examines the Al-Aqsa Intifada and its impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is argued here that the Intifada was the result of long-term frustrations of the Palestinian people with the lack of change as well as the short-term need of the Palestinian leadership for an exit strategy after the Camp David summit. Palestinian strategy aimed at shifting the blame for the failure of Camp David from Yasser Arafat to Ehud Barak and to create maximum international solidarity to pressure Israel into concessions. Yet, closer analysis reveals that despite early suc- cesses, the Intifada strategy is one of diminishing returns. Conversely, Israeli crisis management, while taking some initial blows particularly in terms of public image, has proved relatively successful at preventing the erosion of Israeli positions on the ground. Ultimately, however, neither Palestinians nor Israelis will be able to achieve their respective aims of statehood and security without returning to the negotiating table.
The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, like its predecessor, the 1987– 93 Intifada, was spontaneous in the sense that it was not organized. Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif Temple Mount may have served as the trigger, but it did not cause the uprising, nor was the violence the result of careful strategic planning by the Palestinian political leadership.
One of the more damaging aspects of the Al-Aqsa Intifada has been the emergence of a distinctly religious dimension. Negotiations on Jerusalem in any final status talks always bore in them the potential for the introduction of a destabilizing religious dimension, transforming the conflict from one between Palestinians and Israelis into one between Muslims and Jews as well as replacing possibilities for accommodation and compromise with non-negotiable “God-given” absolutes.