“Getting Control” at Camp David (June–September 1978)

Key takeaways

Getting Control” at Camp David (June–September 1978)

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Bibliography: Strieff, D., 2015. “Getting Control” at Camp David (June–September 1978), in: Strieff, D. (Ed.), Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy, Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan US, New York, pp. 121–139. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137499479_7

Authors:: Daniel Strieff, Daniel Strieff

Tags: #Domestic-Politics, #Foreign-Policy, #Gaza-Strip, #Jewish-Community, #Middle-East

Collections:: Arab-Israeli Conflict

First-page:

Abstract

As Jimmy Carter stepped into view on the floor of the US House of Representatives shortly after 8:00 p.m. on September 18, 1978, the hundreds of lawmakers crowded into the chamber erupted in rapturous applause. The American president made his way to the rostrum and delivered a 25-minute address announcing the conclusion one day earlier of the Camp David Accords, signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin with Carter as a witness. When Carter concluded his speech, he turned to Begin and Sadat, and quoted Matthew 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be the children of God.” Another ovation followed. The moment represented the apogee of Carter’s four years in office, as politician and diplomat, president and peacemaker. 1

Citations

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Reading notes

The US officials maintained strict controls on the flow of information to the media. “We had seen too often the damaging effects of press leaks on negotiations. We were determined to prevent this from happening at Camp David,” according to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.
Carter had both a diplomatic and political need to establish “control” over the proceedings.
The desire for a middle east peace agreement was first and foremost, but the domestic boost was also appealing to make this a success
Carter himself wrote, edited, and rewrote every draft, as he insisted on retaining control of the single negotiating text.
By August, Carter’s Gallup approval rating had fallen to 40 percent (with 43% disapproval), 16 while Roper found that those who identified themselves as “strong” Carter supporters had dropped to 11 percent.
Carter decided by July 30 that Camp David would be the ideal location “because he thought that we could have more effective control over the flow of information.”
Carter, by refraining from saying anything conclusive or of substance, was already trying to play his role as a mediator and “full partner” in the talks. 3
American Jewish organizations, which largely supported the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli negotiating track, welcomed the decision to call the summit
Carter told Begin at one particularly tense moment during the summit, “My reelection is not nearly as important to me as the resolution of the Middle East issue.”
Carter’s Middle East experts decamped to Middleburg, Virginia, to compile the president’s briefing book. These policymakers believed that most of the hard work of the summit would be on the Palestinian issue
Brzezinski echoed Rafshoon’s message about the president’s image. “For the talks at Camp David to succeed, you will have to control the proceedings from the outset and thereafter pursue a deliberate political strategy designed to bring about significant changes in both Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions,” he advised Carter.
As a mediator, Carter employed tactical threats with greater frequency than his predecessors.
Washington would blame Israel.
Israel’s power base resided in Congress; any diminishment of pro-Israel sentiment among lawmakers could threaten economic and military support for Israel.
CIA analysts to conclude that fundamental personality differences divided the Israeli and Egyptian leaders, specifically “Sadat’s abhorrence of detail contrasted with Begin’s predilection for precision and legalism.”
keep the two leaders mostly apart for the duration of the meeting.
Carter and his aides sought to keep tabs on domestic opinion as a means to help fortify his negotiating position.
“ingenious innovations” because it minimized the domestic political pressure on both Begin and Sadat.
Polls measured a spike in Carter’s popularity. 121 One survey conducted the day after the summit found that a plurality (43%) believed Carter was “most responsible” for the accords, compared to 13 percent who credited Sadat and 6 percent Begin
The president’s ability to “control” the situation rapidly diminished once he left Camp David.
Carter made three major contributions to the summit that proved imperative to its success. First, he decided to exclude the media from the proceedings. Second, Carter insisted on a single negotiating text, whereby he maintained control of the document on which all alterations were made while shuttling between delegations. Third, he separated the bilateral issues from the Palestinian ones.
Carter’s domestic constraints influenced the development of the US position and the tactics the president employed to reach agreement.
on.19 This came after a flurry of exchanges during which the PLO had agreed to accept 242 if it were stretched to include mention of Palestinian rights to self-determination. This potential breakthrough, that Carter strong- ly supported, failed when Israel, Egy