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Syria and the Shiites: Al‐Asad's policy in Lebanon

Key takeaways

content: "@abukhalilSyriaShiitesAsad1990" -file:@abukhalilSyriaShiitesAsad1990

Reading notes

• The syrian bathist and lebanese shia alliance is reagrdied as a sectarian pact against the larger sunni world

• The lack of representative governance within the region thanks to colonial oversight and continued exploitation of the region only perpetuates sectarian tension

• As-sadr streesed the need for shia self-represenation and broke with the sunni dominated islamic council and founded the exclusively shia higher islamic shia council

• Baathists from syria and iraq entered lebanon in the 1950s and became part of the rising nationalist and opposition parties

• Started spreading their ideology within and around the American univeristy in beirut

• Major boost towards baathism came from teh 1958 civil warwhere leftists and pan-arabists closed ranks in opposition of the state

• Iraqi baathists became active in lebanon as early as 1960s

• The radical faction met in beirut in 1964 and was opposed by the party founder Mochel Aflaq

• Early splinters left deep scars in the baathist organisations in lebanon

• Effectiveness was also hampered by its underground nature

• In 1966 the Baath party was split between the syriana nd iraqi branches

• Most in lebanon supported the Iraqi Baathists

• Disunity in its ranks was hard to justify on a platform of unity

• Iraq used financial rewards to bolster its political stance and to spread propoganda

• Can help explain the dramatic rise of the Arab Liberation Front in Lebanon prior to 1982

• The lebanese baath party pursued a two pronged policy:

• An open operation

• Party leaders took part in locala nd national elections as early as 1960

• Party relied on its underground military arm to prepare for violent confrontation

• Jointly operated by the Iraqi-sponsored PLO, Arab Liberation Front

• Syria desired intervention not to win the civil war but to maintain the sectarain balance in leabon in order rto maintain complete control over the region

• It also finds that with hegemony over the lebanese region it can use it as a root to the arab-israeli conflict if and when it wishes

• Al-asad may alos have needed to keep the syrian army happy

• Syria and Amal

• The 1970s saw as-Sadr provide religious and political legitimacy toward al-Asad by officially recognising the Alawis as Twelver Shiiters

• Both men needed each other

• As-Sadr's consistency in supporting syria at all costs meant a disollusionment with many allies- including a large amount of the shia population many of whom championed a more militant and radical path int eh first phase of hte civil war

• By the end of the 1975-6 phase, the PLO were discredited by shiites- they ruled with the apparatus of force and secutirty, pillage, looting, and rape were not uncommon

• Anti-palestinian resentment grew

• The interests of Syria and lebanese shiites coincided with their joint dislike of palestinians and the PLO pre-1982 and their anti-sunni feelings

• Sunni political alelgiance came from Saudi Arabia and iraq

• While syria and iran are in agreement over tactical regional issues, they disagree over long term plans for lebanse reforms and both are based on opposing ideologies- making both compete for shia support in lebanon

• Syria and Hezbollah

• h. The rise of Hizbullah had more to do with domestic Lebanese politics and social change within the Shia com- munity than with Iranian conspiracies. Iran played the role of the mid- wife, so to say, for the creation of the Party of God. The Party of God represented the emerging voice of Shia clerics, who felt ignored by Birri's non-clerical leadership.

• The most significant confrontation took place in February 1987, when the Syrian troops entered West Beirut and massacred twenty-three members of Hizbullah in the Fath- allah barracks.