The collapse of the Lebanese state

Key takeaways

content: "@kliotCollapseLebaneseState1987" -file:@kliotCollapseLebaneseState1987

Reading notes

• As Map 1 shows, when the French established their mandatory rule over Lebanon they accepted the Maronite demands and expanded the territory of Lebanon to include the coastal plain, in addition to Mount Lebanon, with the towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, and the Beqaa, which had traditional ties with Syria.8 As for the other sects residing in what was to become Lebanon, the Shiite Muslims, the Druze, the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians resented the supremacy of the Maronites and the insignificant position accorded to them under the emerging political system
• Thus, the state idea of Lebanon was fragile from its very beginning and the Lebanese were never able to overcome the cleavages between those Lebanese who identified with the Arab world and those who identified with the West.
• The loyalty of the Lebanese was always first a loyalty to family and to religious community.'5 The Lebanese have not, until now, defined themselves as Lebanese but as Armenian, Sunni, Beiruti or Druze.'6 Because of its deeply rooted communalism, Lebanese society is not an integrated civil society in the modern sense.'7 Lebanon was then, and still is, a political entity lacking central cultural values.
• In 1958 79 per cent of the Shiite Muslims were illiterate, as were 59 per cent of Sunni Muslims, 51 per cent of the Druze, 50 per cent of the Greek Orthodox, 42 per cent of the Maronites and 31 per cent of the Melkites.25 Moreover, illiteracy is significantly higher in rural Lebanon than in the core area - i.e., Mount Lebanon and the Beirut area.
• Since the mid 1950s the student enrollment in pre-university schools has been increasing at a yearly rate of 9.6 per cent in elementary schools and 24 per cent in secondary schools, but it has not changed the basic educational disparity between Christians and Muslims.27 During the 1960s the educational system came under strong criticism from some political groups who presed for more government-supported public schools as against private schools, and for a predominantly Arabic influence in the curricula - as against the English and French influences.28 Almost all sects of Lebanon have their own autonomous private schools, without any government supervision.
• In 1971, Mount Lebanon with 29 per cent of the Lebanese population had 38.2 per cent of the Lebanese schools while the South with 19 per cent of the population, had only 14.8 per cent of the schools.32 The disparity is heightened by the fact that Mount Lebanon and Beirut are served primarily by private schools, whereas South Lebanon and the Beqaa must rely heavily on the government for the relatively little education available.33 TABLE 1 REGIONAL DISPARITY IN EDUCATIONAL LEVELS Percentage of Students per Population Students to (1972)2 Province' The Province Population - 1959 Population in 'Vo Students per 1000 Beirut 18.8 41.5 383 Mount Lebanon 17.4 18.3 344 North Lebanon 16.3 17.8 200 Beqaa 13.5 10.3 176 South Lebanon 13.2 12.4 172 1.
• Barakat (1977) found that most of the Muslim students in Muslim schools identified themselves as progressive, as supporters of Socialist Democracy, as Pan-Arabist and Pro-Palestinians, while Christians, who studied in private schools, identified themselves as conservative, as supporters of liberal democracy, were for an independent Lebanon and against the Palestinians.34 The spread of education in Lebanon expanded the stratum of people deeply involved in the Lebanese identity crisis, and it did not contribute to the nation-building potential but had disintegrating effects.
• The Muslims were under-represented: the Sunnis who comprised 26 per cent of the population, received only 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats and the Shiites who constituted 27.5 per cent received only 19.3 per cent of the seats.
• It should be noted that Soffer (1986) based his popu- lation estimates on the higher rates of natural increase for Muslims compared with Christians and on the trend of Maronites and other communities to emigrate
• In addition to the sectarian bias and rural over-representation, the Lebanese parliamentary system has other features which limit its integrating function: the parties which are religious or denominational groupings, and the leaders (the Zuama) who suppress horizontal political movement, protecting their ow
• Khalidi (1979) showed that Muslims had a slight edge over the Christians among the rank and file (53 per cent: 47 per cent) while the officer-class composition was 65: 35 per cent in favor of the Christians.57 In the early 1970s, the various religious communities established their own militias, the total size of which reached 100,000 fighters in 1975-76, as against a Lebanese army of 20,000 soldier
• The allegiance of the political leaders was an allegiance to their clan and sect and not to the country at large.60 Shils (1966) described Lebanese society as being deficient in civility and said that many members of the elite were characterized by incivility.6' As Yamak had already pointed out in 1966, sectarianism, regionalism, clan loyalty and landlordism have certainly contributed to the atomization of political life.62 LEBANON AS AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY The importance of the economic factor in the process of integration was first discussed by Deutsch, and stressed 'multipurpose capabilities' of an integrated system as measured by the Gross National Product, and the common sacrifice of resources in order to achieve specific ends.63 An obstacle for the creation of an economic community is uneven economic development and regional inequalities.'r This can occur according to Hechter, during the process of modernization, when certain areas and groups become more advanced and are able to use this to establish their economic and political superiority.65 In addition to GNP per capita, other indicators of economic integration are an even distribution of consumption of goods and services, a general level of well-being, and incidence of unemployment and employment in non- primary sectors.66 As stated before, the vertical stratification of Lebanese society is more significant and meaningful than the horizontal stratification.
• The structure of the economy did not change until the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-76 and the share of the tertiary sector (finance, commerce, transport, education, health) in the Gross Domestic Product increased from 62 per cent in 1950 to nearly 72 per cent in 1970.68 The most conspicuous weakness of the Lebanese economy and one which has had a disintegrating effect is its total dependence on relations with the Arab world.
• Remittances from Lebanese citizens working in Arab oil-producing countries amounted to almost ?L 5000 million a year.69 One estimate, which looked to us too high, stated that the number of Lebanese working outside Lebanon was three million, and their remittances $150 million a month.70 Arab financial remittances in exchange for services are about ?L 1 billion per year.
• The dependence of the Lebanese economy on the oil-based Arab economies means that any slowdown in the economies of these countries affects the Lebanese working there and the remittances which they send back home.72 The prosperous Lebanese economy, based on oil money, did not benefit all sectors of society.
• 14 per cent as well-off and four per cent as rich.74 The very unequal distribution of income in 1959 meant that the wealthiest four per cent received 32 per cent of the total GNP of Lebanon, while 82 per cent of the population received only 40 per cent.75 In 1969, the proportion of income which the rich four per cent of the population received did not change, namely 32 per cent.