#History #timeline

Husni Za'im and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria

Key takeaways

content: "@shlaimHusniZaIm1986" -file:@shlaimHusniZaIm1986

Reading notes

• chief of staff of the Syrian army, Colonel Husni Za'im, overthrew the civilian government headed by President Shukri al-Quwatli in a bloodless coup on 30 March 1949.

• 14 August 1949, Za'im himself was deposed and then executed by some of the disgruntled officers who had helped him to plan and carry out his own coup

• thus, Za'im radically changed the pattern of Syrian politic

• But it was Za'im who carried out the first coup and thereby set the regional trend for military intervention in politics

• d. One of Za'im's top priorities on coming to power was to make peace with Israel, and as part of an overall settlement he even offered to resettle in Syria 300,000 of the total of 700,000 or 800,000 Palestinian refugees created by the war

• critics saw him as a mercurial and mentally unstable individua

• were a number of episodes in Za'im's career prior to 1949 which lend credence to this unflattering view of him, notably his embezzlement of a large sum of money given to him by the Vichy administration in 1941 to organize guerrilla operations against the Free French a

• he was convicted, served a two-year prison sentence, and was exiled to Lebanon.

• return to Syria in 1946, he was appointed inspector general of the police and, in May 1948, chief of the general staff of the army.

• t after the war he became implicated once more in a corruption scandal

• to one theory he staged his coup not to save the country from the politicians but to save his own skin.1 Whether true or not, Za'im does not stand out as a shining example of integrity or altruism, nor was he above exploiting public positions to line his own pockets.

• Appear to have been motivated by a genuine desire to sweep away the old order and lay the foundations for a more just, egalitarian, enlightened, and above all a more prosperous society. Modelling himself on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, Za'im aspired to separate religion and state and to introduce far-reaching social and political reform

• introduced one reform-the enfranchisement of women

• for agrarian reform, he abolished the private administration of family waq

• The offer to settle 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, if enough outside economic assistance could be provided, must be viewed in the context of this general drive to develop and modernize the country. It was the desire for foreign capital to generate nationwide economic development, rather than purely humanitarian concern to alleviate the suffering of the refugees, that constituted his primary consideration

• es, Syria had, potentially, the greatest absorptive capacity

• At home he was supported not just by the army but by the opposition parties, important social groups, and the mass of the people. Jordan and Iraq welcomed the revolution, but, suspecting them of expansionist designs, Za'im quickly abandoned his pro-Hashemite orientation in favour of a close alliance with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

• All the Western powers, for different reasons, looked with favour on the new regime in Damascus

• The French saw in it an opportunity to consolidate their influence

• to sign a currency agreement which ushered in a new era of improved understanding and close economic cooperation between Syria and Fran

• The British, who were widely, but mistakenly, thought to be the secret backers behind Za'im's bid for power, believed the new regime might be instrumental in restoring the regional equilibrium that had been shattered by the termination of the mandate over Pal

• s from America, however, that Za'im received his most enthusiastic and most consistent support

• Shortly before the coup, in February 1949, the Syrian government concluded an agreement with the American oil company ARAMCO, granting the latter the concession to construct a large-gauge pipeline linking its oil fields in Saudi Arabia to the port of Sidon in Lebanon; but the agreement still required parliamentary ratification

• Americans concluded that ratification was unlikely in the face of strong parliamentary opposition and decided to pre-empt defeat by encouraging Za'im to seize the initiative. The facts speak for themselves, argued al-'Azm: shortly after Za'im seized power he ratified the agreement

• was left to Miles Copeland to reveal that the CIA had in fact engineered the coup for Za'im

• no mention of the Tapline agreement

• Za'im rapidly gained the confidence and support of the Truman administration by offering to accept a quarter of a million refugees for resettlement in Syria and by promising to work for a speedy settlement of the dispute with I

• McGhee considered the offer as one of the three best opportunities for solving the refugee pro

• What the Americans did not know is that in the course of his highly checked career, Colonel Za'im had also had some contacts with secret agents of the state of Israel

• Tuvia Arazi, an intelligence agent with a rich record of operations in Syria and Lebanon, made the contact with Za'im

• Toward the end of 1948, Za'im came up with a plan for which he requested a million dollars to topple the Syrian government, put an end to the war, and bring about a change in Syria's policy towards Israel. Arazi and Sasson thought the risk worth taking, but their superiors were more sceptical. Whether any payment was made to Za'im in the end cannot be established with any certainty; but if payment was made, it would have probably been well below his initial asking price

• Danin, a senior intelligence officer in the Haganah, told the author that they used to refer to Za'im jokingly as "Tuvia's employee"

• Once in power, Za'im acknowledged no commitment to Israel, nor did the Israelis have any commitment toward him.

• Yet, he also had some powerful reasons for wanting to make peace with Israel. First, after the defeat of Egypt on the southern front and of Jordan on the eastern front, the full might of the victorious Israeli army could be turned against

• l. Second, Za'im urgently needed to end the war in order to be able to withdraw his army from the front, use it to consolidate his precarious hold over power

• d Iraq. Third, Za'im's strong pro-French orientation and his lack of any ideological or practical commitment to pan-Arabism reinforced his desire to resolve his differences with Israel in the interests of Syria

• nce. But perhaps the most important incentive for modifying Syria's hostile attitude toward Israel was Za'im's expectation of winning American goodwill and su

• General Makleff and Yehoshua Palmon reported that in an informal conversation, at which the UN men were not present, the Syrian representatives were full of admiration for Za'im. They wanted to skip the armistice talks altogether and proceed directly to the conclusion of a peace agreement, with an exchange of ambassadors, open borders, and normal economic relations. They also reported that Za'im had wider regional ambitions; he calculated that Syria and Israel together could field 500,000 soldiers, and that by forming a united front they could dominate the entire Middle East. But since they were offering a separate peace agreement to Israel, they wanted a modification of the border, giving Syria half the Lake of Tiberias.11 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who also held the defence portfolio, instructed Makleff and Palmon to tell the Syrians bluntly that first they must sign an armistice agreement on the basis of the existing international border, and only then might they discuss peace, adding that Israel would be ready for full cooperation

• Ben-Gurion agreed to meet Za'im but only if the latter committed himself prior to the meeting to withdraw all his forces from Israeli territory and to return to the international border.15 This condition, of course, nullified the whole point of the proposed high-level meeting

• General Riley, the UN chairman of the Syrian-Israeli armistice talks, also made representations on behalf of the Syrian ruler in a private conversation with Shabtai Rosen of the Israeli Foreign Ministry

• Abba Eban, the Israeli ambassador to Washington, tried to counter this fixation on the territorial question. He wanted to know why his government was unimpressed by the prospect that Syria would absorb 300,000 refugees.

• 18 The State Department heard from its representative in Damascus that:

• ''Everyone who has discussed that matter with Za'im is impressed by his sincerity and broadminded attitude towards Israel (far cry from stubborn intransigence previous Syrian Government) but his ardour is cooling in face of evident Israeli insatiability. While Za'im is at least trying to measure up to Kemal Atatiirk's stature and is susceptible to moderating influence, it is unfortunately becoming increasingly evident that Ben-Gurion is no Venizelos. Yet unless Israel can be brought to understand that it cannot have all of its cake (partition boundaries) and gravy as well (areas captured in violation of truce, Jerusalem and resettlement of Arab refugees elsewhere) it may find that it won Palestine war but lost peace''

• the few Israeli leaders who did understand that was the moderate foreign minister, Moshe Sha

• There was one school of thought, said Sharett, in an indirect reference to the prime minister, which argued that Israel would not be the loser if matters dragged on inconclusively because formal peace with the Arab states was not a vital need for Israel. The other school of thought, to which Sharett himself belonged, maintained that Israel ought to accelerate the search for a solution because it needed to know whether some of the refugees would be returning before deciding what to do with the Arab villages in their possession

• Sharett communicated to Bunche his willingness to meet either Za'im or his foreign minister, 'Adil Arslan, and suggested a two-point agenda consisting of armistice and peace. Za'im, however, considered it imperative that he meet with Ben-Gurion because none of his own subordinates would dare commit the Syrian government

• Za'im achieved his ambition of climbing from the prime ministership to the presidency of the republic and had his appointment confirmed by a plebiscite held on 25 June.

• Za'im dismissed his nationalistic and fiercely anti-Israel foreign minister, 'Adil Arslan, who was later to claim credit for sabotaging Za'im's efforts to have direct talks with the Israeli leader

• m chose Dr. Muhsin Barazi, with whom he shared not only Kurdish origins but a more flexible attitude towards Israel and a commitment to social reform and economic reconstruction

• Unfortunately for Za'im, the Lausanne conference, which got under way when he was at the peak of his power, turned out to be an exercise in futility

• All the reports and assessments reaching Ben-Gurion confirmed that Za'im was outspoken in declaring his desire for peace with Israel and seriously committed to negotiating a solution to the refugee problem as a first step in the search for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict

• e. Ben-Gurion himself noted in his diary that the fact that Za'im was prepared to settle for an armistice agreement which entailed a total withdrawal to the border proved that for some reason he wanted good relations with the

• 26 Why then not reward Za'im for his courage and reciprocate his concessions with Israeli concessions and let real peace negotiations get under way? The answer is to be found in Ben-Gurion's belief that the armistice agreements were sufficient for Israel's purposes and that it need not strain itself unduly in the pursuit of peace

• "Although I am prepared to get up in the middle of the night and sign a peace agreement, I am not in a hurry and I am prepared to wait ten years. We are under no pressure to do anything."28 Once Ben-Gurion had said that, he had said everything

• Za'im summoned the American ambassador, James Keeley, on 14 July, to express his anxiety over the refugee problem and to stress that unless the refugees could be speedily resettled, their deteriorating situation and morale would make them increasingly amenable to Communist propaganda

• heir backers, Za'im pledged his wholehearted cooperation if the U.S. would take

• refugee labour. To Keeley, Za'im's sincerity was beyond question

• he armistice agreement between Israel and Syria was eventually signed on 20 July 1949-the last in the series of agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab state

• d. The Palestine Conciliation Commission continued its deliberations, but the Israeli contention that the refugee problem was created by the invasion of the Arab states, who should solve it by resettlement, and the Israeli rejection of repatriation as tantamount to committing suicide, left very little scope for compromise

• Danin paid Za'im the compliment of calling him a Zionist, meaning not that he was pro-Israeli but that he aspired to bring to Syria the kind of revolution that the early Zionists had effected in Palestine through the injection of outside capital and the settlement of the land

• Despite rumours and claims to the contrary, Husni Za'im was not overthrown because of his readiness to make peace with Israel

• The principal reason for Za'im's fall was internal: he progressively antagonized all the major groups who had supported his initial rise to power

• But during his brief tenure he gave Israel every opportunity to bury the hatchet and lay the foundations for peaceful coexistence in the long term