#History #timeline

The Protocol of Sèvres: British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956

Key takeaways

content: "@troenProtocolSevresBritish1996" -file:@troenProtocolSevresBritish1996

Reading notes

• Failure of British and French to impose their will upon Nasser and regain control of the Suez Canal marked the decline of European Imperialism

• US and USSR filled the gap

• Egypt won in the political arena where they had lost on the ground and Nasser emerged as the leader of Egypt and the Arab world

• Israel gained a significant military victory and a decade of relative peace

• In 1986 Ben Gurion's Diary from 1956 was released

• Contains the most official account for final negotiations leading to the signing on 24 October 1956 of the document detailing British-French-Israeli collusion- The Protocol of Sevres

• Diary also discusses from four other documents vital to putting the Protocol into action; the Annex in which the French promised air and naval protection from Egyptian retaliation, there were three brief letters were leaders confirmed what was in Sevres and gave authorisation; first on the 25 October from PM Eden to Guy Mollet, the second 26 October from Mollet to Ben-Gurion including Eden's letter, and the third, Ben-Gurion's response to Mollet on the 26 October

• The meeting at Sevres saw a large contingent of French officials, a very small one of the British, and an Israeli delegation led by Ben-Gurion himself

• Few civilian or other government officials knew of the meeting

• The British were so secretive that when Eden found out the protocol had been written and signed by his representative, he had it burned

• Even tried to get the French to burn their copy, but it was misplaced

• The original Israel copy has disappeared- photocopies have been found

• Israelis had grievances that were separate to the interests of the British and French

• Large arms deal in September 1955 between Egypt and Czechoslovakia anticipated a 'second round' of war

• Nassers decision to limit the rights of passage through the Straits of Tiran and continuing border problems provided justification for action

• The British and French were outraged by Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez canal on 26 July 1956

• The French also disliked Nasser's active assistance to rebels in Algeria which the French viewed as part of France itself

• British were apprehensive that Nasser might excerpt pressure to oust them from Jordan and Iraq

• For the three to join against Nasser there were some initial complications

• Tensions between Israel and Britain were a particular hindrance, France acted as an intermediary

• Metaphor used by the British and French, was ''Munich'' (Failure of appeasement) thinking they had an historic duty to stand up to a 'Hitler' like figure

• By October they were desperate to find a pretext for military operations

• The alliance with the two major European powers would give Israel legitimacy it deeply wanted

• Ben-Gurion labelled the plan ''Fantastic''

• Since August 1956 negotiators had only been able to produce a set of scenarios of possible action- Sevres represented the last change for joint action

• Monday 22 October totally surprised the Israelis - it was the first time senior French, British, and Israeli officials met together, with Lloyd and Ben-Gurion having somewhat antagonistic conversations

• Ben-Gurion openly mistrusted the British and resented being exploited while subject to possible treachery

• ''He said that Nasser was our enemy and he denied us our rights. I said that he had been doing it for yeats and no one had protested''

• Pineau followed Lloyd to London on Tuesday, 23 October to salvage the meetings

• On the 24th Logan and Dean arrived from London and the formulation on the Protocol began in earnest

• Ben-Gurion insisted that the document be signed by leaders representing the different parties

• Each party went home to seek ratification by the home governments as stated by the final clause of the Protocol

• The Protocol establishes that Israel was to launch an invasion in the Sinai on the evening of 29 October and head for the Canal Zone

• Then provides the ultimatum of the British and French on the following day

• Key part is the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops from the Canal zone and for Egyptian agreement to permit a temporary stationing of British and French troops in key positions alone the canal

• Anticipating Egyptian refusal, calls for joint British and French action on 31 October

• The remaining clauses answered Israeli aims and concerns

• Allows for occupation of the Egyptian side of the Gulf of Akaba and the islands in the strait of Tiran to ensure freedom of Israeli shipping

• British promised to not implement their treaty of assistance to Jordan should that country come to the aid of Egypt

• The French offer Israel an ''Aerial umbrella''

• On the 25th the French Annex was signed as were letters confirming the contents of the Protocol by heads of British and French governments

• For Israel verbal agreements were not enough

• So great were Ben-Gurion's suspicions of the British he notes “This[Eden’s] letter is typical of the British Foreign Office for it can be interpreted in various ways, while the French state clearly to what they have committed themselves, as was discussed with them without adding or subtracting.”

• In confident anticipation of agreement by his Cabinet, Ben-Gurion wrote Mollet that his government approves “with great pleasure” the Protocol of Sèvres. It is noteworthy that both Eden and Ben-Gurion exchanged letters with Mollet, not with the each other.

• 27 October, Ben-Gurion finally met with and gained the approval of the ten members of his party serving in the Cabinet.

• 28 October, he informed the full Cabinet and, after something of a mock discussion—Ben-Gurion noted in his diary that the members of his party who had been informed at the Saturday meeting acted as if they were hearing the news for the first time

• Israel sent its forces into Egyptian territory in the evening of 29 October

• On 31 October, the British and French began an aerial bombardment during the evening rather than before dawn as planned.

• On 6 November, the “diplomatic clock” ran out as world public opinion and American and Soviet pressure forced the British and French to halt their invasion without achieving a clear military victory or toppling Nasser.