Beyond Rational Choice Theory

(2003) - Raymond Boudon

Journal: Annual Review of Sociology
Link:: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100213
DOI:: 10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100213
Links::
Tags:: #paper #RAT
Cite Key:: [@boudonRationalChoiceTheory2003]

Abstract

▪ Abstract  Skepticism toward sociology has grown over recent years. The attention granted to rational choice theory (RCT) is, to a large extent, a reaction against this situation. Without doubt, RCT is a productive instrument, but it fails signally in explaining positive nontrivial beliefs as well as normative nonconsequential beliefs. RCT's failures are due to its move to use too narrow a definition of rationality. A model can be developed that combines the advantages of the RCT (mainly providing self-sufficient explanations), without falling victim to its shortcomings. This model is implicitly used in classical and modern sociological works that are considered to be illuminating and valid.

Notes

“Horowitz (1994) evokes the “decomposition of sociology,” whereas Dahrendorf (1995) wonders whether social science is withering away.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 1)

“As Hollis (1977) puts it, “rational action is its own explanation.” To Coleman (1986, p. 1), “Rational actions of individuals have a unique attractiveness as the basis for social theory. If an institution or a social process can be accounted for in terms of the rational actions of individuals, then and only then can we say that it has been ‘explained.’ The very concept of rational action is a conception of action that is ‘understandable,’ action that we need ask no more questions about.”” (Boudon, 2003, p. 2)

“The first postulate, P1, states that any social phenomenon is the effect of individual decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., (individualism). A second postulate, P2, states that, in principle at least, an action can be understood (understanding). As some actions can be understood without being rational, a third postulate, P3, states that any action is caused by reasons in the mind of individuals (rationality). A fourth postulate, P4, assumes that these reasons derive from consideration by the actor of the consequences of his or her actions as he or she sees them (consequentialism, instrumentalism). A fifth postulate, P5, states that actors are concerned mainly with the consequences to themselves of their own action (egoism). A sixth postulate, P6, maintains that actors are able to distinguish the costs and benefits of alternative lines of action and” (Boudon, 2003, p. 3)

“that they choose the line of action with the most favorable balance (maximization, optimization).” (Boudon, 2003, p. 4)

“The social phenomena that RCT is incapable of accounting for share many features in common. Three types of phenomena that slip RCT’s jurisdiction can be identified.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 8)

“The first type includes phenomena characterized by the fact that actors base their choices on noncommonplace beliefs.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 8)

“RCT is powerless before a second category of phenomena: those characterized by the fact that actors are following nonconsequentialist prescriptive beliefs.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 9)

“RCT is powerless before a third category of phenomena, that involving behavior by individuals whom we cannot in any sensible way assume to be dictated by self-interest.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 9)

“In sum, RCT is disarmed when it comes to (a) phenomena involving noncommonplace beliefs, (b) phenomena involving nonconsequentialist prescriptive” (Boudon, 2003, p. 9)

“beliefs, and (c) phenomena that bring into play reactions that do not, by the very nature of things, spring from any consideration based on self-interest.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 10)

“false beliefs can be grounded on strong reasons, and in that sense are rational, as familiar examples show.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 11)

“Weber’s “axiological rationality” is often understood as synonymous with “value conformity.” I would propose rather that the expression identifies the case where prescriptive beliefs are grounded in the mind of social actors on systems of reasons perceived by them as strong, in exactly the same way as descriptive beliefs (Boudon 2001a).” (Boudon, 2003, p. 14)

“Why does an actor consider a system of reasons to be good? Kant wrote that looking for general criteria of truth amounts to trying to milk a billy goat. We should recognize with Popper that there are no general criteria of truth, but also, against Popper’s theory of science, that there are not even general criteria of falsity. A theory is considered false only from the moment when an alternative theory is found that is definitely better.” (Boudon, 2003, p. 16)