Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

(2007) - Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis

Journal: Annual Review of Sociology
Link:: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812
DOI:: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812
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Tags:: #paper #RAT
Cite Key:: [@fehrHumanMotivationSocial2007]

Abstract

Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation emphasize the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation emphasize incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here we develop a general approach – the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach – showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the micro-foundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals’ social goals.

Notes

• We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominate the aggregate level of social cooperation

• Introduction

• Sociological has not reached a parsimonious, empirically grounded view of the basic motivational driving forces of human behaviour, which may be due to the limited role that controlled experiments played in the development of the discipline

• Hobbes concluded that social order is the product of powerful social institutions, including property rights, codified law, and a strong state. Hobbes's approach has been strongly espoused in modern times by neo-classical economic theory

• Unfortunately, conventional repeated game theory- based on the assumption of Homo Economicus- has failed to produce plausible analytical models of social cooperation in a state of nature because these models do not have the required properties of dynamical stability and informational robustness

• Social order as a public good

• One key aspect of social order can be captured by public goods experiments in which self-interest and the social good are counterposed with great clarity