Rational Action Theory for Sociology

(1998) - John H. Goldthorpe

Journal: The British Journal of Sociology
Link:: https://www.jstor.org/stable/591308?origin=crossref
DOI:: 10.2307/591308
Links::
Tags:: #paper #RAT
Cite Key:: [@Goldthorpe1998]

Abstract

btional action theory (RAT) is not a highly unified intellectllal entity. In the first part of the paper, varieties of RAT are disiinguished in terms of three criteria: i.e. according to whether they (i) have strong rather than weak rationality requirements; (ii) focus on situational rather than procedural rationality; (iii) claim to provide a general rather than a special theory of action. In the second part, these same criteria are applied in a consideration of which version of RAT holds out most promise for use in sociology

Notes

• Goldthorpe seeks to assess the multiple versions of Rational Action Theory; Strong verus weak, situational versus procedural, and general versus specified. He considers which version of RAT holds the most promise for use in sociology.

• Introduction

• RAT arguments: (i) commitment to methodological individualism, (ii) belief that a theory of action must therefore be central to sociological enterprise, and (iii) analytic primacy in sociology lies with the consequences of individual action

• The model of the actor to be used in this task does not however, have to be one that is capable of capturing all the particular features- all the idiosyncrasies- of the actions of the flesh-and-blood individuals involved, but only 'central tendencies' in their action.

• Varieties of RAT

• (i)

• Rational action may be considered as action of an 'outcome orientated' kind in which certain requirements are met regarding the nature of, and the relations among: actors' goals, their beliefs relevant to the pursuit of such gaols.

• Rationality requirements may be seen as at their strongest where they extend to actors' goals in themselves, as well as to their beliefs and the action they take towards their goals on the basis of their beliefs

• Commonly in RAT the nature of ones goals is regarded to be exogenous to the theory and thus unrestricted. Actors goals are to be determined empirically.

• Questions of the rationality of beliefs are dealt with by the assumption that actors have 'perfect knowledge'

• The key idea that has been exploited in this connection is that of subjective, as opposed to objective rationality.

  • The idea that actors may hold beliefs, and in turn pursue their course of action for which they have ''good reasons'' even though they may fall short of the standard rationality that utility theory would presuppose

    • The best known example is the theory of ''bounded rationality''

• A further version of RAT based on the idea of subjective rationality but orientated toward a more sociological lens is developed by Boudon (1989, 1994) labelled as the 'cognitivist model'

  • Inspiration for his work is found in the neo-Kantianism of Max Weber and Simmel, in particular the latter's argument that reasoning that is perfectly valid in itself may lead to false beliefs because it is carried out in the context of certain implicit, unexamined propositions (a priori) that are inappropriate- though perhaps far from evidently so.

• One other example of RAT should be noted- the weakest form of rationality is embodied in the 'Analysis of situational logic' of proposed by Popper

  • That aim is to understand action as rational simply in the sense of being 'appropriate' given actors goals and given their situation of action which is taken as their beliefs.

  • Proponents of such an approach argue that it can be applied to situations where actors appear to be quite irrational

  • In other words, rationality is assumed ab initio, even if in a more attenuated case. No claim is made that the assumption that individuals do act appropriately or adequately to the situations in which they find themselves- 'the rationality principle'- as Popper calls it- is true.

• (ii)

• In mainstream economics it is clear that in this case rationality in action is understood essentially in response or reaction to the situation

• Given their preferences, they way for them to act rationally, as it assumed that they will act, is situationally constrained to an extreme degree (Latsis 1976)

  • The paradox arises that the 'theory of rational choice' par excellence turns out to imply that little real choice in fact exists: for typically, the actor's situation is characterised as a 'single-exit' one

• If one begins with the idea of objective rationality Simon argues, then all conditions of interest are located 'outside the skin' of the actor. With subjective rationality, it relies on satisficing rather than maximising behaviour, attentions thus have to centre on conditions existing 'inside the skin' of the actor in particular human computational capacities and constraints that they impose.

• Contributions from Lindenberg and Frey tried to provide more solid psychological foundations for the idea of subjective rationality stemming from the actor's own 'definition of the situation' by drawing on 'prospect' or framing theory.

• Subjective rationality can still go together with a commitment to situational determinism. This is demonstrated by the position of Popper and the analysis of situational logic.

  • For Popper, it is vital to establish that a commitment to methodological individualism in no sense entails a commitment to 'psychologism'

  • What is important is not actors' mental states or processes but the nature of their beliefs, or as Popper states, of the objective knowledge that is situationally available to them with their subjective understanding is anchored.

  • The rationality principle, the principle that actors do act appropriately or adequately in the situations in which they find themselves, then simply serves to 'animate' the analysis (Popper 1994)

    • Its methodological significance is that in being substantively empty, it requires that it is the situation of action that becomes the focus of attention

• (iii)

• Limits to the explanatory scope of RAT are reached when it gives way to behaviour that must be externally explained

• The 'Economic Imperialism' of Becker views RAT in the form of utility theory as being able to form a general theory of social action

• The weakening, or 'emptying', of the concept of rationality in the way that was earlier noted can be seen as a direct application of the 'principle of charity' in interpretation that characterises the hermeneutic tradition

  • Observed action is as far as ever possible to be 'reconstructed' as rational, so that it may in turn be rendered intelligible- verstandlich- rather than being left to explanation of a merely external kind

• Coleman (1990) implicitly draws on its varieties gives important place to modes of action that lie beyond the explanatory range, in particular in the formation of trust relations and of 'social capital' more generally

• Rather than striving in the manner of Becker or Popper to always find some way of 'saving' action as rational, Elster adopts the view that RAT should not be constituted as a general theory, but rather as being that currently availble special theory around which the effort to achieve greater generality could be best organised

• Which RAT for Sociology?

• Should be looking for a RAT that (a) can off greatest explanatory power via the micro-macro link but that (b) will be most likely, where its explanatory power fails, to promote further research through 'progressive problem shifts' rather than merely defensive 'immunising stratagems'

• (i)

• Versions of RAT that impose the strong requirements of objective rationality are attractive in that they allow clear predictions to be made about how actors will- indeed should- act in given situations

• However, from a sociological perspective, two major disadvantages arise. First, the assumptions appear unrealistic and empirically untenable. Second, where these versions of RAT fail, problem shifts are not typically recognised of a kind that would seem likely to guide sociological research onto promising lines

• 

• Seems little doubt that sociologists would be best served by some version of RAT weaker than that of mainstream economics in requiring only subjective rationality

• Would suggest to hold onto the idea of rational action as outcome-orientated or 'consequentialist' (Elster 1991), in the sense that it derives from some kind of cost-benefit evaluation made by actors of the different courses of action that are available to them relative to their goals

• (ii)

• The strong case, is that in favour of sociologists taking up a rather extreme position: one well towards the situational end of the range of variation that was earlier described

• Individual action does not have to depend on any elaborated psychology of the acting individual

• Poppers situational concerns would appear better suited to understanding central tendencies in the kinds of decision that are made, usually of course in far less formal and explicit way, by individuals in the course of their everyday lives, and that sociologists pursuing RAT are in turn likely to invoke as the basis of their explanations of emergent macrosocial regularities

• Abell (1992) is right in maintaining that for sociologists wishing to comprehend subjective rationality, the modelling of actors' 'information environments' must be of primary concern

• Whilst explanations of action in terms of subjective rationality take the form of reconstructions ex post actu, rather than entailing predictions, this in no way precludes their testing or indeed their refutation

• (iii)

• If one argues for a RAT that is subjectively rational, but with full recognition then being made of the need to delimit what shall count as such action and to focus on enquiry on its situational understanding, it obviously follows that RAT in such a variation will be a special theory

• Instead of seemingly anomalous action being accommodated ad hoc, the aim to 'endogenies' it through a genuine theoretical development is required

• Critiques of RAT

• The idea that rational behaviour is prior to that not only of irrational but non-rational beahviour

• Hermeneutic privilege- we can as social scientists best say that we understand the actions of others

• Explanatory privilege